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Abstract




many investigators and readers delineate a randomized trial as high quality if it is “double-blind,” as if double-blinding is the sine qua non of a randomized controlled trial. … A randomized trial, however, can be methodologically sound … and not be double-blind or, conversely, double-blind and not methodologically sound.
-	Schulz, Chalmers, and Altman (2002)

1.	The Problems with Double Masking as a Requirement for Clinical Trial Validity

Being ‘double blind’ or ‘double masked’, where neither the participants nor the investigators are aware of who gets the experimental treatment, is almost universally trumpeted as being a virtue of medical experiments. The official Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) text, for example, states:
Blinding is necessary to avoid patients’ reporting of symptoms or their adherence to treatment being affected by hunches about whether the treatment is effective. Similarly, blinding prevents the report or interpretation of symptoms from being affected by the clinician’s or outcomes assessor’s suspicions about the effectiveness of the study intervention (Straus, Richardson et al. 2005, p.122).

For good reason (at least on the face of it), the praise for double masking is not limited to EBM proponents. The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA 1998), other authorities  ADDIN EN.CITE (CONSORT 2006; 2000) as well as prominent medical researchers and statisticians (Hill and Hill 1991, p. 214; Jadad 1998, p. 20; Bland 2000, p. 19; Armitage, Berry et al. 2002, p. 605; Greenhalgh 2006, p. 66) all explicitly claim that double blinding is an methodological virtue.
	The intuitive appeal of making double blinding a methodological virtue is understandable. The potentially confounding influences of participant and investigator expectations can be eliminated by successful double masking. If the investigator is aware that a particular participant is in the experimental arm of the trial they may lavish more attention on them​[1]​. This increased attention could have therapeutic benefits for certain ailments. Similarly, if the participant believes she is receiving the best treatment (as opposed to the placebo), then her knowledge that she is in the experimental arm could lead her not only to report better outcomes, but to experience greater beneficial effects.
	In spite of its intuitive appeal and widespread support, there are several reasons to question double masking as a universal methodological virtue. For one, certain treatments resist being tested in double blind conditions. The Phillip’s Paradox suggests that any treatment that turns out to have dramatic effects will not remain double blind​[2]​. It seems strange – to say the very least – that an account of evidence should deliver a purely a priori judgment that a certain type of claim can never be supported by ‘best evidence’. It would of course be different if the claims at issue were pseudoscientific – untestable. But so far as treatments with large effects go at least, the claim that they are effective is highly testable and intuitively it would seem that they should receive much greater support from the evidence than do claims about treatments with only moderate effect sizes. Hence the claim that double blinding is a universal virtue is arguably inconsistent with educated scientific common sense.
Moreover, double masking is far more difficult to achieve than is generally supposed. Both participants and investigators may be far better at guessing whether they are in an experimental or control group than has hitherto been assumed. If it turns out that successful double masking is inherently problematic, then positing double blinding as a standard is futile. Last, there double masking is costly as it tends to reduce external validity.
In this paper I will evaluate the role of double masking from the fundamental view that good evidence rules out plausible rival hypotheses. To anticipate, I will argue that when investigated this way, it is clear that the methodological value of double masking is far more limited than is usually admitted. After a few clarifying remarks about the meaning of double masking, I outline the rationale for the view that double masking increases the internal validity of a study. Then, I contend that there are severe practical limits to the potential success of attempts to keep trials double masked. If so, then there is little value in being described as double masked. Finally, I show how double-masking could impair external validity, since it contributes to making the trial importantly different from routine clinical practice. In conclusion, double masking, although it potentially increases the internal validity of a study, does not always do so. Further, since double masking may not be possible, we may be better off seeking other ways to control for the potentially confounding effects of expectations.
2.	The Many Faces of Double Masking: Clarifying the Terminology
First, my use of the term ‘masked’ instead of the more common ‘blind’ requires some defense. The term ‘blind’ is ambiguous in trials of blind people, and it is especially abhorred by researchers of eye disease (Bland 2000, p. 19). Second, ‘masking’ someone implies that the concealment procedure could be imperfect. As I will argue later, the process of concealing knowledge to study groups is less successful than most of us believe, and indeed may be inherently difficult to achieve. Third, the term ‘masking’ is more in line with the historical meaning. Early trials that concealed the nature of the treatments from participants literally used masks (Kaptchuk 1998).
Masking is the act of concealing the nature of the intervention from one of the groups involved in the study. For example, in a single masked randomized trial of vitamin C versus placebo as a cure for the common cold, the participants in the trial could be prevented from knowing whether they were taking the placebo or real vitamin C.
Six groups involved in a trial that are sometimes masked, namely (1) participants, (2) intervention dispensers (or simply ‘dispensers’), (3) data collectors, (4) outcome evaluators, (5) statisticians, and (6) mansuscript authors. The same person, or people, might, of course, play more than one role. Empirical studies suggest that the term ‘double masked’ is used in over a dozen ways to describe the masking of different subsets of the possible trial groups that can be masked (Devereaux, Manns et al. 2001). About a third defined “double masking” as masking of the participants and dispensers. The remaining definitions included various combinations of 2, 3, and 4 masked groups. Because of this ambiguity, the CONSORT Statement​[3]​ (Moher, Schulz et al. 2001) recommend identifying the particular groups that have been masked rather than using the terms “single masked”, double masked, or “triple masked”, etc.
Although specifying exactly which groups have been masked is always useful, I will reserve the term double masked for trials that mask the participants and the dispensers. Reserving the term double masked for trials where the participants and dispensers are masked emphatically does not mean that masking the other groups is unimportant. Masking the other groups may well rule out confounders and that it is therefore important to attempt to achieve masking of these groups. Any arguments I present about the limited value of double masking do not bear on the importance of masking the other groups.
With the definition of double masking out of the way I can proceed to question why should double masking should be considered important.
3.	Participant Expectation and Pygmalion Effects as Confounders
In this section, I will explain why it is commonly held that beliefs of participants and dispensers that they are receiving/dispensing the experimental intervention can confound a study.
3.1.	 Participant belief
A participant’s belief that she is being treated with an effective drug could, at least in theory, translate into effects for the outcome of interest. For example, if I believe I am being given the latest and best treatment for the common cold, I may well recover more quickly than had I not taken the latest treatment, or I may well report that I have recovered more quickly and this is all that is at issue when the outcome is subjective.
I will call the effects of knowledge that one is being treated with something one believes at least may be effective  “belief effects”​[4]​. To measure the effect of participant belief, we need a trial where one group of participants knows they are receiving the intervention, while another group does not believe they receive the intervention. Recent studies of analgesics employed such a design. Using an innovative version of the placebo controlled trial that I will describe below, Benedetti and a team of researchers at the University of Turin treated patients “overtly” and “covertly” for postoperative pain, Parkinson’s, and anxiety. I will focus on the case of postoperative pain.
In a study of pain (Benedetti, Colloca et al. 2004) Benedetti’s team used four common  painkillers -  buprenorphine, tramadol, ketorolac, and metamizol - on a total of 278 patients who had undergone thoracic surgery for different pathological conditions. The postoperative patients were taken to have provided their ‘informed consent’ when they were “told that they could receive either a painkiller or nothing depending on their postoperative state and that they will not necessarily be informed when any analgesic treatment will be started” and they agreed to be in the study.  “In this way, patients [did] not know if or when the treatment [was] given.” (Benedetti, Colloca et al. 2004, p. 680).
The patients were then, of course unbeknownst to them, randomized into “overt” and “covert” groups with sex, age, weight, and pain baseline-balanced. The “overt” group was treated by doctors who “gave the open drug at the bedside, telling the patient that the injection was a powerful analgesic and that the pain was going to subside in a few minutes” (Benedetti, Colloca et al. 2004, p. 681). Then, one dose of analgesic​[5]​ was administered every 15 minutes until a 50% reduction of pain (from baseline) was achieved for each patient. The “covert” group, on the other hand had the analgesic delivered by a pre-programmed infusion machine (already attached to the patient) without any doctor or nurse in the room. The pain reduction for both sets of patients was measured every 15 minutes on a 10-point subjective pain scale where 0 = no pain and 10 = unbearable pain. The results were that over 30% more analgesic was required by the patients who were treated covertly (p-values ranging from 0.02 – 0.007 depending on drug). 
Benedetti’s study has been criticized on the grounds that the patients in the covertly treated group may have detected when they were getting treated in spite of the attempt that it was done ‘covertly’. Some experimental drugs could be identifiable from their side effects quite independently of its effect on pain (Kirsch 2003). If some of the participants in the hidden’ group had strong suspicions that they were receiving an analgesic, this would tend to enhance the effects of the ‘hidden’ administration and make it more difficult for the effect of open administration to be greater, and hence to demonstrate a belief effect. If Kirsch’s worry is well-founded, then we would expect a reduction in the difference between open and hidden administration. Therefore (again, if Kirsch’s worry is well-founded), since the study already provided evidence for a difference between open and hidden administration (and hence expectations effects), we can conclude that the study provides even stronger evidence for expectation effects than is indicated by the results.
3.2.	Beliefs of the Dispensers: When the ‘Pygmalion Effect’ is a Confounder
A classic, though non-medical example of how dispenser beliefs may have effects is the ‘Pygmalion experiment’, carried out by Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobsen. Pygmalion was the name of a Greek artist who sculpted a statue out of ivory and fell in love with it. Subsequently, the statue came to life. Likewise, it is thought that dispensers who seek a particular outcome can influence, perhaps in unconscious or subtle ways, whether it comes about.
In the spring of 1964, in a real public (state funded) elementary school that Rosenthal and Jacobsen call the ‘Oak School’ (the real name is withheld), experimenters administered the “Harvard Test of Inflected Acquisition” to all (>500) students in grades 1 to 5. Teachers were told that the test “predicts the likelihood that a child will show an inflection point or “spurt” [i.e. point of rapid academic improvement] within the near future” (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1992, vii). Teachers administered this test, but the tests were scored separately by two blind assessors. Then, the teachers were then given names of the students who were most likely to “spurt”.
As a reason for their being given the list of names, teachers were told only that they might find it of interest to know which of their children were about to bloom. They were also cautioned not to discuss the test findings with their pupils or the children’s parents” (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1992, p.70)
After a year, the same IQ test was administered by the teachers and graded by independent, blind assessors. The “spurters” improved significantly more than the others (see table below). The top 20% of the students named by the test improved in all areas significantly more than the other students (results summarized below).

Table 2.  Mean gain in Total IQ after One Year by Experimental- and Control-Group Children in each of Six Grades​[6]​
GRADE	CONTROL	EXPERIMENTAL	EXPECTANCY ADVANTAGE









* Mean square within treatments within classrooms = 164.24

In fact the test was a standard IQ test, and the 20% of students who were predicted to “spurt” were chosen completely at random!
The Oak School experiment suggests that the expectations of teachers (and students) can have objective effects on student performance. More generally it suggests that “one  person’s expectation for another person’s behavior can quite unwittingly become a more accurate prediction simply for its having been made” (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1992, vii)​[7]​.
The mechanism of Pygmalion effects is not necessarily mysterious. A teacher, believing that a student was ready to ‘spurt’ might pay special attention to that student which could easily translate into accelerated rates of improvement. At the same time, the scarce resources spent on the ‘spurters’ is not ‘wasted’ on those less likely to improve​[8]​.
If there are ‘Pygmalion effects’ in medicine, then if a dispenser believes that she is administering the best experimental treatment (as opposed to placebo) to a patient, then her belief may translate into improved outcomes of the experimental treatment that have nothing to do with its characteristic​[9]​ features. A caregiver, believing that an extremely ill participant was being given a great new treatment, coupled with the belief that the new treatment is effective, might provide that patient with a higher quality of care. On the other hand, if the caregiver believed that a different patient was being given a placebo, the dispenser might not bother providing the highest quality of care – it might be ‘not worthwhile’, especially given that they all have scarce resources to distribute amongst their many patients. An obvious scenario where dispenser knowledge could have effects is if the dispenser has an interest in showing that the experimental treatment works. The role of these personal or financial interests could be either conscious or, more charitably, unconscious.
Benedetti’s pain study and the Pygmalion study show that at least in some circumstances  participant and dispenser beliefs seem to have genuine effects. Double masking would clearly rule out these effects if they are confounding.
The rationale for double masking can therefore be summarized as follows. At least at the start of a double-blind trial, agents are told (and presumably believe) that they have an equal chance of being in the experimental or control group. This prevents the potential effects of participant or dispenser beliefs from confounding the study.
I will now examine three cases where expectations in the experimental and control group might not be confounding, and therefore where double masking might not add methodological value.
4.	Why Double Masking is Less of a Worry for Active Rather than Placebo Controlled Trials
A confounding factor is one that
1.	is unrelated to the experimental intervention,
2.	is a determinant of the outcome, and
3.	is unequally distributed between experimental and control groups
If participant beliefs about effectiveness are the same in the two arms of an active controlled trial (and after all neither treatment is presented as mere placebo) then there would of course be no confounding by them if the trial were open. My expectations regarding aspirin and a new NSAID​[10]​ for mild headache, for example, are likely to be the same and any trial comparing the two would not be confounded by failing to remain single masked.
But are those beliefs likely to be identical in general? Research (Chalmers 1997) suggests that they are not. People seem to believe that ceteris paribus, the latest intervention is more effective than the older standard intervention, in spite of the fact that the new interventions are more likely to be less effective than the older interventions. In an open active controlled trial, if everyone in the trial believed that the latest intervention was best, then the beliefs and effects of beliefs could well be different in the test and control groups.
I will call beliefs about the effectiveness of treatments that have nothing whatsoever to do with the characteristic effects of the intervention ‘prejudice’. Once prejudice is recognized as a potential confounder, it can be controlled for, at least partially. For example, participants with preferences for the experimental intervention could be introduced in equal measure to both groups. Restricted randomization is probably the easiest way to achieve this, but it is also possible to adjust post hoc for prejudice even in observational studies.
Or, a more sophisticated way to control for prejudice is to employ the so-called ‘patient preference’ design. Here
Patients may be placed in one of three groups according to preference and willingness to be randomised: (a) patients who have no strong preferences and therefore consent to randomisation; (b) patients with a preference who still consent to randomisation; and (c) patients who refuse randomisation and opt for their treatment of choice (Torgerson and Sibbald 1998)

In short, patients with explicit preferences would be given the opportunity to opt out of the randomized trial and receive their preferred intervention.
To be sure, people’s ‘prejudices’ may well not be apparent to them. If not then they will be impossible to control. Still, controlling for participants’ ‘conscious’ prejudice will reduce any potential confounding effects of prejudice even it is not altogether eliminated. Dispenser attitudes could be controlled-for in a similar manner.
These strategies for reducing confounding of participant expectation and dispenser attitudes, although not perfect, are nonetheless surely useful. These strategies will not generally be successful for placebo controlled trials, where it would be difficult to find any participants at all who have a prejudice for placebo treatment.
Prejudice may be exacerbated or caused by what I will call hype. Some treatments are more fashionable than others. This could be due to the fact that the older, standard treatments have accumulated an extensive side effect profile while the new treatment represents hope. This hope is sometimes boosted by aggressive marketing. For example, Prozac, an SSRI antidepressant, was marketed to consumers in the United States before it was approved for marketing (a practice illegal outside the United States and New Zealand). Eli Lilli, the company who developed Fluoxetine, chose the name Prozac, which was unrelated to the characteristic chemical compound that was supposed to be responsible for the effect on serotonin levels. Previous to Prozac, drug names were often related to the characteristic chemical. The name Prozac was probably chosen because of the positive connotations of its prefix. The end result was that the number of ‘depressed’ people demanding prescriptions (some even before they were approved for marketing) for SSRIs such as Prozac skyrocketed to levels unheard of in the past (Healy 2004, introduction; Block 2007).
Further, although it is difficult to control for the inevitable effects of hope that some new intervention will be more effective or less harmful than an older intervention or than no intervention without double masking or placebo controls, it is important to separate this hope from unjustified advertising of new interventions. If the advertising is conducted before there is sound evidence to support the view that that new interventions are safe and effective​[11]​, then it is false that we have any grounds to believe that an experimental treatment is more effective than an older one.
Indeed there are equally good reasons to fear new treatments as there are to expect that they will be better. Because early trials are usually relatively short, or at any rate often too short to pick up long-term side effects, there are equally good reasons to fear newer experimental treatments as there are to hope that they are better than standard care.
Another circumstance where participant expectations and dispenser beliefs will may not confound a study as much as we think is where these potential confounders have no actual effects. I will consider this case in more detail now.
5.	Where Participant Expectation and Dispenser Attitude Do Not Confound a Study: Resolution of the Phillip’s Paradox

Even if the effects of beliefs are different in the test and control groups, if beliefs are characteristic rather than incidental features, then they cannot be considered confounders. To see why, imagine there were a drug whose only characteristic feature was a chemical that was dramatically effective at making any depressed person who took it believe that the intervention had powerful characteristic effects that cured depression. Call the characteristic feature of this new drug the x-factor. Because depression is probably particularly sensitive to beliefs, the drug containing the x-factor may well prove very effective for the treatment of depression. However the drug has no other characteristic features for changing the chemicals, such as serotonin, that are currently believed to be correlated with, or cause, depression. Imagine that this drug demonstrated significantly superior effectiveness to standard SSRI antidepressants. The only reason that the new drug was more effective was because of participant belief. Adopting the rule that all belief effects are confounding would lead one to claim that the imaginary study was confounded by the different beliefs even though the beliefs were a direct result of the characteristic feature. In short, if the increased expectations in the experimental group arise from the characteristic features of the experimental treatment, then they cannot be considered confounding.
Next, participant and dispenser beliefs might not be a worry where their potential confounding effect is small relative to the size of the characteristic effects of the test intervention. Acute appendicitis or meningitis might well be influenced by beliefs, but it is unlikely that the effects of belief are significant relative to the effect of the treatment. For this reason, appendectomies and antibiotics for meningitis have of course never been tested in double masked conditions. The effects of a participant believing he is receiving an effective intervention may well have some effects, but it is unlikely that these effects would be strong enough to explain avoiding death from acute appendicitis. As Smith and Pell (2003) imply, you don’t need a double masked RCT to know that parachute use prevents death in someone falling from a plane.
The case where the characteristic effects appear dramatic resolves the Phillip’s Paradox stated at the outset of this paper where dramatically effective treatments cannot be tested in double blind conditions. At least according to the view that double masked studies are of higher quality than open studies, paradoxically, dramatically effective treatments, are not supported by the best possible evidence. However where the treatment effect is dramatic (such as appendectomy for acute appendicitis), it is safe to assume that expectations or attitudes could not account for the entire effect. Hence, although participant expectations and dispenser attitudes might have confounded the study, they were not sufficiently powerful to present a rival hypothesis for the entire effect. In short, the potentially confounding effects of expectations and attitudes in trials of dramatically effective treatments are relatively insignificant. Therefore, the Phillip’s Paradox dissolves once we abandon universal adherence to the rule that double masking increases quality and instead evaluate studies based on the view that good evidence rules out plausible rival hypotheses.
In yet another circumstance, participant and dispenser beliefs might not have significant effects; if not, then double masking will not add methodological value. The interesting studies of participant expectation or belief conducted by Benedetti’s team, along with the Pygmalion studies and studies of different coloured placebos, might lead one to believe that participant and dispenser attitudes can, and often do, play a significant role. However, the dispenser, or teacher effects in the Pygmalion studies tapered off as the students aged (see table 5.1). Likewise, Benedetti’s study, although it showed significant effects of participant belief, was restricted to studies of a few ailments and did not show clinically relevant effects. In this section I will argue that current evidence suggests the magnitude of participant and dispenser beliefs varies quite widely. In some cases, they might not have any effects at all while in others they may well have clinically relevant effects. Double masking will help in the latter, but not the former cases. The structure of my argument is as follows:
(1)	If there are participant and dispenser beliefs then there are placebo effects​[12]​
(2)	There is evidence that placebo effects are insignificant outside treatments whose outcomes are subjective and continuous outcomes.
(3)	Therefore, there is evidence that participant and dispenser belief effects are insignificant in some cases (such as for certain objective outcomes).
If we identify the set of incidental features what produces any overall placebo effect that there may be in particular circumstance, then if participant and dispenser beliefs have effects it follows that there are placebo effects – since no ‘regular’ therapeutic theory gives a ‘characteristic’ role to such beliefs (at any rate in regular pharmacological treatments, where the characteristic features are exclusively the ‘active’ chemicals. In two recent meta-analyses, Asbjørn Hróbjartsson and Peter Gøtzsche (2001) looked at 3-armed trials that included experimental, placebo control, and untreated groups and found no overall significant placebo effect. If we assume that the three groups were always free from selection bias, that the “untreated” groups were actually untreated, and the placebo controls were legitimate, the placebo effect could fairly be estimated as the difference between the average effect in the placebo group less the average effect in the untreated group.
Defining placebos “practically as an intervention labelled as such in the report of a clinical trial” (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2001, p. 1595) Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche searched several major medical databases​[13]​ for 3-armed RCTs. They excluded studies where participants were paid or were healthy volunteers, where the outcome assessors were unmasked, where the dropout rate exceeded 50%, and when “it was very likely that the alleged placebo had a clinical benefit not associated with the ritual alone (e.g. movement techniques for postoperative pain)” (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2001, p. 1595). (I will discuss whether their exclusion criteria were justified after outlining the study.)
After identifying 727 potentially eligible trials, they excluded 404 for not being randomized, 129 for failing to have a placebo group or an untreated group (although they were described as having one), 29 for being reported in more than one publication, 11 for using unmasked outcome assessment, 24 for meeting other exclusion criteria such as high dropout rates. Sixteen trials did not include relevant outcome data. This left 114 trials for the meta-analysis. Typical pill placebos were lactose pills, typical ‘physical’ placebos were procedures performed with the machine turned off (e.g. sham transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation), and typical psychological placebo was theoretically neutral discussion between participant and dispenser. Over 40 clinical conditions were included in the analysis, ranging from hypertension and compulsive nail biting to fecal soiling and marital discord.
They classified the trials according to whether the outcomes were binary (“yes” or “no”) or continuous, and whether the outcomes were subjective or objective. For binary outcomes, they calculated the relative risk of an unwanted outcome, which is the ratio of the number of participants with an unwanted outcome to the total number of patients in the placebo group divided by the same ratio in the untreated group. A relative risk below 1 therefore indicates a positive placebo effect. With continuous outcomes, the authors calculated the standard mean difference, the difference between the mean value for an unwanted outcome in the placebo group and for the no treatment group, divided by the pooled standard deviation. A value of –1 indicates that the mean in the placebo group was 1 standard deviation below the mean in the untreated group.
Although there was significant (p=0.003) heterogeneity among trials with binary outcomes, placebo did not have a significant effect… (overall pooled risk of an unwanted outcome with placebo 0.95; 95 percent confidence interval, 0.88 to 1.02). For continuous outcomes, there was a significant placebo effect for trials with subjective outcomes (-0.36; 95% confidence interval –0.47 to - 0.25), but not for trials with objective outcomes (-0.12; 95% confidence interval –0.27 to 0.03). There was also significant heterogeneity (p=0.001) for trials with continuous outcomes. However, there was significant (p=0.05) relationship between size of trial and placebo effect, indicating that bias due to small trials played some role. Of all the ailments that were treated in more than 3 trials, only pain showed a significant effect (-0.27; 95% confidence interval –0.40 – 0.15).
In sum, there were significant placebo effects for trials of pain (where the outcome measure was subjective) and in general for trials of ailments with subjective continuous outcomes. Even in these cases Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche even question whether these studies provide evidence of placebo effects.
Patients in an untreated group would know they were not being treated, and patients in a placebo group would think they were being treated. It is difficult to distinguish between reporting bias and a true effect of placebo on subjective outcomes, since a patient may tend to try to please the investigator and report improvement when none has occurred. The fact that placebos had no significant effects on objective continuous outcomes suggests that reporting bias may have been a factor in the trials with subjective outcomes” (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2001, p. 1597).

Indeed the so-called ‘Hawthorne Effect’, which is part of what we mean when we talk about placebo effects, is, very briefly, the positive effect of being in an experiment no matter what the intervention is.​[14]​ If there are Hawethorne Effects, then we might expect them to be greater in the placebo control group than in the ‘no treatment’ group. If so then we would expect the placebo effect enhanced relative to no treatment.
Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche conclude that there is:
little evidence that placebos in general have powerful clinical effects. Placebos had no significant pooled effect on subjective or objective binary or continuous objective outcomes. We found significant effects of placebo on continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain but also bias related to larger effects in small trials. The use of placebo outside the aegis of a controlled, properly designed clinical trial cannot be recommended (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2001, p. 1599).

However, there were several problems with Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s study, including heterogeneity. The authors jumble (along with placebo pills and injections) relaxation (described as a placebo in some studies and a treatment in others), leisure reading, answering questions about hobbies, newspapers, magazines, favourite foods and sports teams, talking about daily events, family activities, football, vacation activities, pets, hobbies, books, movies, and television shows as placebos (Kirsch 2002). Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche seem to admit that this is a problem: “we cannot exclude the possibility that in the process of pooling heterogeneous trials the existence of such a group [of trials that showed a significant placebo effect] was obscured”.
In fact if we adopt the reasonable stance that some ailments are placebo responsive while others are not, Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s results are not ground breaking. On this interpretation their study merely shows that the placebo effect may not be as prevalent as was once believed.
Yet in reaction to criticism Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche dug in their heels to produce an updated systematic review that allegedly confirmed their initial results (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2004). The conclusion of the updated paper was similar to that of the first:
In conclusion, we reproduced the findings of our previous review and found no evidence that placebo interventions in general have large clinical effects, and no reliable evidence that they have clinically useful effects. A possible effect on patient-reported continuous outcomes, especially on pain, could not be clearly distinguished from bias (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 2004, p. 98).

Problems with the Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche studies notwithstanding, there are two important points they highlight. First, their method for measuring the magnitude of belief effects is correct, if done properly. Measuring the difference between placebo and no-treatment, is the correct way to measure placebo effects. Second, it is possible, indeed probable, that the placebo effect varies depending on the intervention, the ailment, and the type of outcome.
Another empirical study needs mentioning before concluding this section. In a study of 33 meta-analyses Schulz et al. claim that the unmasked studies odds ratios were exaggerated by 17%.​[15]​ This study seems to suggest that participant expectation and dispenser attitudes (whose effects were supposedly neutralized in the masked studies) have a 17% effect. I will leave aside the fact that other studies of the effects of unmasking have had conflicting results (Miller, Colditz et al. 1989; Moher, Pham et al. 1998) to focus on a problem they all share. Schulz’s team failed to define which groups were masked. If, for example, it was the outcome assessors and not the dispensers that were masked in the masked studies and unmasked in the unmasked studies, their beliefs could have been responsible for the different effects. The authors recognized this shortcoming, admitting that the meager information on the approaches used for double masking made it difficult to interpret what the source of exaggerated effects are (Schulz, Chalmers et al. 1995). In light of the ambiguity with which the term double masking has been used, it is difficult to interpret this study as evidence for participant and dispenser belief effects.
To sum up this section, double masking will not reduce the potentially confounding effects of participant and dispenser beliefs as much in active controlled trials as it will in placebo controlled trials. Then, there are cases where beliefs are not confounders. These cases are (a) where the beliefs are characteristic features of the treatment, (b) where the belief effects are small relative to the characteristic effects of the experimental treatment, and (c) where there are no belief effects.
I will now question whether double masking is a realistic goal.
6.	The Near-Impossibility of Successful Double Masking

Attempting to double mask a study is one thing; keeping it successfully double masked for the duration of a trial is another. There is strong evidence to suggest that even when the best efforts are made, double masking is rarely successful for the duration of the trial. This is because to keep the trial successfully masked means that the appearance, smell, taste, and side-effects of the experimental intervention must be mimicked by the control. Otherwise, given the (usually enforced) requirement of full informed consent whereby participants are made aware of the nature of the experimental intervention (potential effects, side effects, etc.), participants and dispensing physicians will correctly guess whether a particular intervention is the experimental treatment or control. If it is the case that double masking is unlikely to be successful, then the apparent of advantage of being double masked’, this refers to attempts to keep the trial masked, is nullified and open trials are equally good.
In a recent study, Fergusson, Glass, Waring, and Shapiro (2004) investigated whether trials described as double masked were successful. Whether a trial is successfully double masked can reasonably be ascertained by asking participants and dispensers to guess which participants were in the treatment or control groups –if guesses do significantly better than chance then there is a degree of ‘unmasking’. These authors conducted a Medline search of randomized, placebo controlled trials published from 1998 to 2001 in 5 top general medical and 4 top psychiatry journals​[16]​. Their search turned up a total of 473 medical trials and 192 psychiatry trials. From this group they randomly selected 100 trials in each group. Nine of the randomly selected trials were excluded because they were not placebo controlled in spite of being described as such​[17]​. They ended up with 97 medical trials and 94 psychiatry trials.
Of the 97 medical trials, only 7 provided evidence of the success of double masking. Of those, only 5 reported that the masking was unsuccessful​[18]​.
Five trials reported that the success of blinding was imperfect. The trial that did not present blinding data described blinding as successful without further comment. The trial that reported aggregated data did not comment qualitatively, or provide statistical tests of success of blinding (Fergusson, Glass et al. 2004).
Of the 94 psychiatry trials, 8 reported evidence of testing for successful masking. Four of these reported that the masking was unsuccessful. Overall:
15 of the 191 trials (8%) provided such information, be it qualitative or quantitative. Of the 15 trials, only five trials reported that blinding was successful and of these, three did not present any quantitative data analysis to support their claim (Fergusson, Glass et al. 2004)​[19]​.

This study suggests that masking is rarely tested for and, where tested for, rarely successful. It incited a flurry of responses on the BMJ website by prominent medical researchers such as Stephen Senn, David Sackett and Douglas Altman. Describing the well-known ‘Tea Lady Experiment’ Senn claim that ‘unsuccesssful’ masking is not a methodological failing as long as it is a result of the efficacy of the treatment:
The classic description of a blinded experiment is Fisher’s account of a woman tasting tea to distinguish which cups have had milk in first and which cups have had tea in first in support of her claim that the taste will be different. Here the efficacy of the treatment, order of milk or tea, is “taste” and the lady’s task is to distinguish efficacy. Fisher describes the steps, in particular randomization, that must be taken to make sure that the woman is blind to the treatment. But if he were to adopt the point of view of Fergusson et al, there would be no point in running the trial, since if the lady distinguished the cups, the trial would have been described as inadequate, as she has clearly not been blind throughout the trial. (Senn 2004) What Senn claims is that, in cases where the participant (i.e. the ‘Tea Lady’) correctly guess which is the ‘experimental intervention’  (i.e. the milk first cups of tea) because they have identified the characteristic feature (i.e. whether milk was poured first), that it is mistaken to call the trial inadequate.
Although Senn may be mistaken about the classic description of a blinded experiment – the point of the Tea Lady experiment is to demonstrate the value of concealed random allocation – his point that successful masking is difficult to achieve with effective treatments is well made. Sackett echoes Senn’s view that testing for successful masking once a trial is underway is difficult:
Once a trial is under way, I'm not smart enough to separate the effectiveness of blinding from the effects of pre-trial hunches about efficacy, and I've never met anyone who is. Accordingly, we v(r?)igorously test for blindness before our trials, but not during them and never at their conclusion (Sackett 2004).
Sackett and Senn are surely correct that in some cases, namely where the characteristic features of the test treatment are so apparent that the trial becomes unmasked, should not count against the methodological value of the trial. On this view, investigators should attempt to make a double masked trial at the outset. Then, if the participants or dispensers correctly guess which intervention they are taking or giving, it is unimportant because it is often the characteristic features of the treatment that cause the unmasking.
Yet even if Sackett and Senn are correct, their arguments only apply in cases where the unmasking is due to the characteristic features of the experimental treatment. As I explained earlier, if the effects of the experimental treatment are dramatic, then the ‘unmasking’ of the study cannot be said to have impaired its methodological quality. Yet, unmasking can occur because of many reasons other than characteristic effectiveness, dramatic or otherwise. For instance, cases where the side-effects of the experimental treatment are identifiable will lead to unmasking that does impair a study’s methodological quality. Where unmasking occurs for these other reasons, it does in fact call the adequacy of the trial into question. Further, both Sackett and Senn are incorrect that the different reasons for unmasking cannot be disentangled. Perhaps even more relevantly, ignoring other possible reasons for unmasking is unjustified. As Shapiro notes, “[i]t seems contrary to an evidence based approach to avoid obtaining data because we have to struggle with its interpretation. (Shapiro 2004).
	To illustrate, imagine a trial of an antidepressant drug whose characteristic chemical has no effects yet that has unique and recognizable side effects versus inactive placebo (one that does not mimic the side-effects of the experimental treatment). If this is the case then participants could guess when they are in the experimental arm of such a trial, which could lead to increased beliefs and expectations about recovery, and hence better effects.
In order to determine whether unmasking was due to the characteristic or non-characteristic features, the tests for successful masking could ask why participants believe that they were in a particular group. In short, if a trial comes unmasked for reasons other than characteristic effectiveness then it is legitimate to claim that double masking has not achieved the purpose of ruling out confounding participant and dispenser beliefs. Contrary to what Sackett implies, it is possible, at least to some extent, to discover the reasons for unmasking.
In fact, another study was conducted in 2007 by a research team at the Nordic Cochrane Centre that made the case for the difficulty of keeping a trial successfully double masked even stronger (Hróbjartsson, Forfang et al. 2007). It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide the details of this more recent study.
To make matters worse, there are good reasons to believe that the problem of successfully double masking a study may run deep. Recall that the placebo control, in order to permit the trial to remain successfully double masked, had to be similar in superficial appearance (taste, smell, touch), side effects, and effectiveness to the experimental treatment.  The practical difficulty in designing placebo controls that meet these conditions, especially with regards to obscure side effects, may be insurmountable.
For example, one side effect of SSRIs is increased probability of sexual dysfunction. How could this side effect be imitated? People could not. Even if there were some drug which raised the probability of sexual dysfunction that could be added to the control treatment, a further set of problems emerges. First, it would have to be established that the drug did not have effects (either positive or negative) for the target disorder. Second, it would be ethically problematic to deliberately cause harm with a control treatment. Third, there would still be the other side effects of the experimental intervention (most drugs have more than one side effect) and of the drug for sexual dysfunction.
It could still be maintained that because it is possible in some cases, trials that attempt to keep the double mask are superior to those that do not. Further, because the problem with retaining the double mask has only been highlighted recently, we might expect the rate of successful double masking to increase in the near future. Since double masking raises the probability of ruling out some confounding factors, a trial’s being described as double masked is a methodological value that makes it superior to open trials. However, as was pointed out in the previous sections this alleged potential advantage of double masking will not be actualized in all cases.
Furthermore, attempts to keep trials double masked have their costs. Keeping a trial double masked makes the conditions of the trial different from the conditions in routine clinical practice. In an attempted double masked placebo controlled trial, the dispenser administers an intervention that she cannot know for sure is an ‘effective’  (nonplacebo) treatment. The participant receives the intervention with a commensurate degree of doubt. This doubt may affect their beliefs  and hence the effectiveness of the experimental or control intervention. In contrast, in routine clinical practice, the dispenser usually offers an intervention with confidence, and the patient believes that they are being treated with a nonplacebo.
It could be argued that the doubt about which treatment patients in a trial have been given does not make a difference to the estimated effects of the characteristic treatment. As long as the doubt is the same in both the test and control groups, then any reduced belief effects will ‘cancel out’ because they are reduced equally in the test and control group. Recall that in a placebo controlled trial the characteristic effects are calculated by subtracting the average effect in the test treatment group from the average effect in the control group. If both these groups have effects reduced by doubt, then as long as the doubt is the same in both groups, the effect estimate of the characteristic features will remain constant. An analogous argument applies to double masked active controlled trials.
The argument that the reduced belief effects ‘cancel out’, however, relies on the assumption of additivity whereby the component features of a treatment (participant and dispenser belief, other incidental factors, and characteristic factors), simply add up to form the composite effect. If additivity does not hold, then changing the effect of participant or dispenser belief could affect the overall effectiveness in a different way. I will discuss the assumption of additivity further in another work.
In sum, it seems safe to say that attempts to keep a study double masked may often fail. This may be because of the inherent difficulty in imitating an intervention’s sensory qualities and side effects. The apparent methodological advantage of being double masked at the outset of a trial may therefore be frequently illusory – trials are rarely successfully double masked. If many trials are not successfully double masked, then the basis for considering double masked trials superior to open trials becomes difficult to uphold.
Moreover, the seemingly legitimate aim of double masking studies where it seems reasonable has its costs. Before concluding the way in which double masking might reduce external validity must be explained.
A trial is internally valid “ to the extent that its outcome truly measures the impact of the treatment on the outcome so far as the trial population is concerned (Worrall 2007`, p. 10). A trial is externally valid to the extent that its results are applicable to the wider public (‘target population’) in conditions of routine practice. Since double masking appears to rule out one possible explanation for the observed outcome other than the characteristic feature of the test treatment, namely participant expectations and dispensing dispenser bias, it would appear as that double masking increases the internal validity of the study. Double masking, of course, adds a further difference to trial conditions. In routine practice, people are usually given an option of which treatment they prefer, and they are treated openly. These differences between trial and routine practice conditions could, at least in principle, threaten the external validity of the trial.
7.	Conclusion
The view that double masking always adds methodological value was exposed by the Phillip’s Paradox whereby dramatically effective treatments are not supportable by double masked, and hence ‘best’ evidence, to be wanting. In this paper I examined the methodological values from the more fundamental point of view that good evidence rules out rival hypotheses, and hence that better evidence rules out more rival hypotheses.
Double masking, where successfully executed, rules out the potential confounding factors of participant expectations and dispenser attitudes. However there are three situations where these potential confounders are not actual confounders (or not significant confounders). First, there are some situations where patient and dispenser expectations do not have effects. Second, there are other cases, perhaps some ‘active’ controlled trials, where the expectations could be the same for both groups. Third, in cases where the experimental treatment has a dramatic effect, any expectations might have (relatively) negligible effects.
My investigation in this paper also revealed that in practice, keeping trials successfully double masked is usually difficult and sometimes impossible. This means that the property of being described as double masked does not necessarily mean that any methodological value has been added. In cases where it is likely that double masking will not be successful (i.e. where the side effects of the experimental treatment are common and difficult to imitate), ‘open’ trials lose their relative disadvantage. Indeed, in these cases it may be better to seek other ways to control for the potentially confounding effects of expectations and attitudes. For example, by explicitly controlling for participant prejudice and by placing greater emphasis on masking the outcome assessors and statisticians.
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^1	  The experimenter could also encourage them to remain in the trial. Intention-to-treat analysis means that drop-outs in the experimental arm tend to reduce the apparent effectiveness of the experimental treatment.
^2	  There are further difficulties with keeping a trial double blind, which I shall discuss below.
^3	  CONSORT stands for Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials, and consists of a checklist that investigators should heed when conducting and reporting trials. The Statement is endorsed by hundreds of medical journals, including The Lancet, and the New England Journal of Medicine.
^4	  These are also commonly called “expectation effects”. However, there is a debate about whether it is the expectation, conditioning, or meaning of the treatment that are responsible for the effects (Moerman and Jonas 2002; Benedetti, Colloca et al. 2004; Kirsch 2004). I will not delve into this debate here. The salient feature of all these possible mechanisms is that the participant must have some kind of awareness that she is being treated.
^5	  Doses of different analgesics were standardized according to a method described earlier (Benedetti, Vighetti et al. 1998).
^6	  Recreated from table 7.1 in (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1992, p. 75). Note that the number of participants in the experimental group is not exactly 20% of the total. This is because “it was felt more plausible if each teacher did not have exactly the same number or percentage of her class listed” (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1992, p.70).
^7	  Interestingly, Popper uses the name Oedipus Effects for the same phenomenon as Pygmalion effects (it is unclear whether Popper was familiar with the Pygmalion experiments (Popper 1969, 1.II, footnote 3).
^8	  The Pygmalion experiments are an interesting comment on IQ tests, which are supposed to be a measure of ‘innate intelligence’. Quite obviously if the tests are sensitive to teachers’ attention then they do not measure ‘innate’ intelligence accurately.
^9	  The term ‘characteristic’ is borrowed from Grünbaum (1986) and is used to describe features of a treatment process that are sometimes referred to as ‘specific’ or ‘active’. For example, fluoxetine would be the characteristic feature of treatment involving Prozac. Other features, including the prescription from a sympathetic physician, would be ‘incidental’.
^10	  Non-Steroidal, Anti-Inflammatory Drug, such as ibuprofen.
^11	  I leave a discussion of whether this trust is justified to another study. Suffice it to note that at least in the case of the FDA, the bias is towards approval of the new treatments. Indeed until 1962  a new drug merely had to demonstrate safety, and not effectiveness. They still do not need to demonstrate greater effectiveness than the best existing treatment.
^12	  In theory, if participant and dispenser belief effects are offset by the effects of other incidental features, there would be no overall placebo effects even if there were participant and dispenser belief effects. However in practice this is unlikely to be the case.
^13	  Medline, EMBASE, PsychLIT, Biological Abstracts, and the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register up to 1998.
^14	  The Hawthorne Effect is named not after an author, but after the name of a series of experiments in the Hawthorne works of the Western Electric Company in Chicago between 1924 and 1933. In one study, for example, the illumination remained stable for the control group and was slowly raised for the experimental group. Productivity increased equally in both groups. In another study, illumination was stable in the control group but was slowly lowered in the experimental group. Productivity increased steadily and equally in both groups until the lights were so low in the experimental groups that the experimental workers protested and production fell off (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). The “Hawthorne Effect” has been interpreted many ways. Here I will take it to be the potential (sometimes temporary) positive effects of being in an experiment.
^15	  Odds ratio = 		odds of outcome event / odds of no even in control groupodds of outcome event / odds of no outcome event in experimental groupOutcome eventTotalYesNoControl GroupAba + bExperimental GroupCdc + d= (a/b) / (c/d)= ad / bcThe odds ratio is a measure of effect size. An increase in 17% of the odds ratio, however, does not mean an increase of 17% absolute effect size. A 17% increase in odds ratios can be due to a much smaller increase in absolute effect size. 
^16	  Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Annals of Internal Medicine, Archives of General Psychiatry, Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, British Journal of Psychiatry, and the American Journal of Psychiatry.
^17	  In spite of noting that double masking is important for active controlled trials, the authors limited their evaluation to placebo controlled trials.
^18	  The authors don’t define success. I will assume that it means that significantly more participants correctly guessed which group they were in than would be predicted by chance alone.
^19	  Fergusson et al. proceed to question whether the studies which provided quantitative data on the success of double masking were methodologically sound, and claim that they weren’t.
